(Paul Gleason, Ship Island) |
I have
been asked to give input on wildland firefighter safety to the Fire and Aviation
Staff - Safety and Training, Washington Office. First, let me say I am honored
to be able to contribute at this level. The afternoon of June 26, 1990, as I
knelt beside a dead Perryville firefighter, I made a promise to the best of my
ability to help end the needless fatalities, and alleviate the near misses, by
focusing on training and operations pertinent to these goals.
Throughout
my career I have dealt with wildland fire suppression, as a Hotshot Crew
supervisor, with only minor injuries occurring to those I have directly supervised.
This is primarily because of two reasons, luck (which cannot be ignored) and
basic lessons which I have learned from the exceptional firefighters I have had
the opportunity to work with. Many of the really valuable suppression lessons I
learned were prior to fire shelter requirements.
Subjective vs. Objective Hazards
A
popular mountaineering text divides the alpinists' hazards into two distinct types;
subjective, which one has direct control over (e.g., condition of the equipment,
the decision to turn back) and objective, hazards which are inherent to the
alpine environment (e.g., avalanches, rock fall). Objective hazards are a
natural part of the environment. They cannot be eliminated and either one must
not go into the environment where they exist or adhere to a procedure where
safety from the hazard is assured.
Similarly,
the wildland firefighters' hazards are either subjective or objective. Examples
of subjective hazards would be working below a dozer constructing fireline or
the use of improper techniques while felling a tree. The fireline supervisor
has direct control over these types of hazards.
The
wildland fire environment has four basic objective hazards; lightning, fire-weakened
timber (standing and lying), rolling rocks and entrapment by running fires.
When these hazards exist the options are to not enter the environment or to
adhere to a safe procedure. I feel the key to this safe procedure is LCES.
Although, the following discussion applies to all objective hazards, we will
directly address fire entrapments.
LCES
LCES
stands for lookout(s), communication(s), escape routes and safety zone(s). These
are the same items stressed in the FIRE ORDERS and "Watchout" Situations.
I prefer to look at them from a "systems" point of view, that is, as
being interconnected and dependent on each other. It is not only important to
evaluate each one of these items individually but also together they must be evaluated
as a system. For example, the best safety zone is of no value if your escape
route does not offer you timely access when needed.
A key
concept - the LCES system is identified to each firefighter prior
to when it must be used. The nature of wildland fire suppression dictates
continuously evaluating
and, when necessary, reestablishing LCES as time and fire growth progress. I
want to take a minute and briefly review each component and its interconnection
with the others.
Lookout(s) or
scouts (roving lookouts) need to be in a position where both the objective
hazard and the firefighter(s) can be seen. Lookouts must be trained to observe
the wildland fire environment and to recognize and anticipate wildland fire
behavior changes. Each situation determines the number of lookouts that are
needed. Because of terrain, cover and fire size one lookout is normally not
sufficient. The whole idea is when the objective hazard becomes a danger the
lookout relays the information to the firefighter so they can reposition to the
safety zone. Actually, each firefighter has the authority to warn others when
they notice an objective hazard which becomes a threat to safety. ·
Communication(s)
is the vehicle which delivers the message to the firefighters, alerting of the
approaching hazard. As is stated in current training, communications must be
prompt and clear. Radios are limited and at some point the warning is delivered
my word of mouth. Although more difficult, it is important to maintain
promptness and clearness when communication is by word of
mouth.
Incident
intelligence (regarding wildland fire environment, fire behavior and suppression
operations) both to and from Incident Management (i.e., Command & General Staff)
is of utmost importance. But, I don't view this type of communication a normal
component of the LCES system. Entrapment occurs on a fairly site-specific
level. Incident intelligence is really used to alert of· hazards (e.g.,
"Watchout" situations) or to select strategic operations. LCES is
primarily a Division function; responsibility should be here.
Escape Routes
are the path the firefighter takes from their current location, exposed to the
danger, to an area free from danger. Notice that escape routes is used instead
of escape route(s). Unlike the other components, there always must be more than
one escape route available to the firefighter. Battlement Creek 1976 is a good
example of why another route is needed between the firefighter's location and a
safety zone.
Escape routes
are probably the most elusive component of LCES. Their effectiveness changes
continuously. As the firefighter works along the fire perimeter, fatigue and
spatial separation increases the time required to reach the safety zone. The
most common escape route (or part of an escape route) is the fireline. On
indirect or parallel fireline, situations become compounded.
Unless safety
zones have been identified ahead, as well as behind, firefighter retreat may
not be possible.
Safety Zone(s)
are locations where the threatened firefighter may find refuge from the danger.
Unfortunately shelter deployment sites have been incorrectly called safety
zones. Safety zones should be conceptualized and planned as a location where no
shelter is needed. This does intend for the firefighter to hesitate to deploy
their shelter if needed, just if a shelter is deployed the location is not a
true safety zone. Fireline intensity and safety zone topographic location
determine safety zone effectiveness.
Again, a key
concept - the LCES system is identified prior to when it must be used. That is,
lookouts must be posted with communications to each firefighter, and a minimum
of two escape routes from the firefighter's work location to a safety zone (not
a shelter deployment site) every time the firefighter is working around an
objective hazard.
Safety and
tactics should not be considered as separate entities. As with any task safety
and technique necessarily should be integrated. The LCES system should be
automatic in any tactical operation where an objective hazard is or could be
present.
LCES is just a
re-focusing on the essential elements of the FIRE ORDERS. The systems view
stresses the importance of the components working together. The LCES system is
a result of analyzing fatalities and near-misses for over 20 years of active
fireline suppression duties. I believe that all firefighters should be given a
interconnecting view of Lookout(s), Communication(s), Escape routes and safetyzone(s).
Division Operations
Establishing a
Lookout position in the Operations function has its merits. The Lookout(s)
would be assigned directly to the Division Supervisor. They would have only one
responsibility, albeit and important one. Lookouts keep one eye on the fire and
the other on the Division's firefighters.
Commonly
Weather Watches and Field Observers are incorrectly assigned lookout duties.
Division Supervisors should solicit input from these sources for their decisions,
but these positions are in the Planning Section, not Operations. Lookouts need
to be identified prior to tactical deployment of suppression resources and they
need to give their undivided attention to the Division's objective hazards and
firefighter location.
Ideally each
crew would establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations. But, this
requires the ability to identify these situations and to establish adequate (in
amount and location) lookouts for the situation. Additionally, all to often
crew supervisors hesitate to remove a crew member from fireline production and
assigned them the position of lookout. They do not realize that the assignment
of lookouts is not only their authority but also their responsibility.
Incident
Management, through Operations and Planning, would identify the operation's
"Watchout" Situations, divisions on which they are (or could) occur and
assign qualified lookouts to the Division Supervisor.
Span of Control
Span of control
depends directly on the quality of resources and their capabilities. 3-5 subordinates to
each supervisor may be sufficient for a static environment when there is direct
access to each subordinate; but in the active wildland fire environment
experienced leadership is necessary on a tighter ratio. Jerry Monesmith
presented solutions via the geographical breakdown of a division into
"segments."
Crucial to any
solution is the definition of "experienced." How would you define
experienced?
Many reasons have
been given for the lack of experience including an organization's inability
for employee retention and insufficient BASIC suppression skill development.
Downhill/Indirect Firelines
The two
situations that firefighters traditionally have found themselves getting
into trouble are downhill and indirect fireline operations. The lessons learned
on the Loop Fire ('66) developed awareness, and consequential guidelines, for
downhill fireline construction. Since then downhill operations have become
safer; everyone agreesthe only one who works in a chimney is
Santa
Claus, and he
does it in the dead of winter. Unfortunately, we still have a ways to go
(i.e., Battlement Creek, '76).
Indirect
firelines are a different story. In the last half of the 1980's all the
entrapments have occurred during indirect operations. Extreme fire behavior
with active spotting has put more reliance on indirect strategies. With
indirect fireline the firefighter finds themselves removed from the best safety
zone, the burn, as well as unable to see the objective hazard.
"Floating" Division
A floating division
is the planned division during an indirect operation that exists initially only
on paper (a map). It is not anchored. Wildland fire suppression tactics stress
the importance of beginning construction at an anchor point (point where there
is the least chance of being outflanked). To safely deploy resources on a
"floating" division it is extremely important that the division is
initially anchored and that the anchor point is also a safety zone. Only then
can resources safely begin work developing the LCES system as they progress.
The success of
the operation depends on the safety of personnel and the ability to hold the
fireline. It is crucial that indirect fireline location is determined after
careful analysis of wildland fire behavior possibilities including that
behavior which will result if the fire enters the third-dimension crowning/spotting
from both wind-driven and plume-dominated fires). All too often the full
possibilities are not incorporated in location decisions.
Wildland/Urban Interface
Suppression in
the wildland/urban interface presents its own unique set of problems. The
choice of fireline location is often influenced by the homes which stand
between the fire front and a "better" option. Often the standard tactics
of anchoring at the rear (or heel) and flanking will leave improvements in the
path of the wind-driven fire.
The lack of an
ideal fireline location does not in itself constitute unsafe indirect strategy.
The "urgency" of the operation causes a break-down in solid tactics.
During interface suppression operations, maybe more than any other operation,
the LCES system must be in place.
With the rapid
spread rates reached by wind-driven fires only two options are available. The
traditional "anchor and flank" strategy or the unorthodox protection
of improvements and resources as the wildfire spreads past. The later dictates
the necessity for a "defensible space" around each improvement sufficient
to serve also as a safety zone, a true safety zone. Unless this precaution has
been made the risk to defending the improvement may not be worth the operation.
Judgment Errors
John Dill, head
rock climbing rescue ranger in Yosemite NP, recently made an analysis of errors
in judgment made precluding an accident. He found three reasons which
contributed to the accidents: ignorance, casualness and distraction. After thinking
about the firefighter's environment and accidents these same reasons were found
to correspond. Allow me to take a moment and help draw the correlations. Ignorance:
Unfortunately, we still have firefighters and fireline supervisors who still
end up in wildland fire situations that call for skills and knowledge beyond
their level of training. I know it is stressed over and over, but the BASICS,
basic wildland fire behavior, basic suppression skills, need to be learned and
reviewed. Yet many of the entrapments are the result of no lookouts or an
insufficient safety zone, a lack of the basics.
Casualness: The
rock climber standing at the base of a couple thousand foot granite wall in
Yosemite is reassured in their decision to undertake a challenging ascent
because of the helicopter which is poised less than a mile from the proposed
ascent. We are doing the same. The situation is viewed more casually because we
have an option if the tactic fails -- our fire shelter.
Another way
casualness enters our environment in through the reinforcement of improper
tactics since the fire does never "blowup" while we are working the fireline
the first few, or several, times. But then we find ourselves entrapped because
the familiar situation changes and our reliance on improper tactics just
doesn't work this time.
Distraction:
Often I have been told that was it not for the on-the-job training that was
given by a Division Supervisor the hazard would have been noticed and tactics
would have been adjusted. Distraction is a very, very real problem for
firefighters. Fatigue and carbon monoxide do not help with the decision-making
process either. Fireline personnel should be continually monitor each other and
remain open to communication· and others evaluation of the situation at hand.
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Who was Paul Gleason?
In short, Paul Gleason was a leader. Paul succumbed to cancer in 2003 following a wildland fire career that spanned several decades. During his career Paul led and mentored firefighters, he studied and taught wildland fire, and through his contributions to the wildland fire community, improved firefighter safety. Paul developed the LCES (Lookout, Communication, Escape Routes, Safety Zones) concept that became the foundation of firefighter safety. When asked what he would like his legacy in fire to be, Paul said this: "I suppose I would want my legacy to be that firefighters begin to realize the importance of being a student of fire and that I was able to help make that happen."
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