On October 27, 2003, Santa Ana winds, with gusts of more than 50 mph, drove the Grand Prix Fire across the Los Angeles County line towards the communities of La Verne and Claremont. With most their fire resources assisting in San Bernardino County, Los Angeles County fire officials called the national Incident Management Team (IMT) at Grand Prix Fire to ask for help.
They received a frustrating reply. “We can’t help.”
At the time, all engine companies in Los Angeles County were committed to ongoing fires. No reserve engines were available at any stations. When new calls came in, engines had to be redeployed from other fires. High ranking fire officials were out on fires, fighting to protect their homes and those of their neighbors. Sixty-five residences were lost that morning.
When the fire reached the Angeles National Forest, federal officials wanted to bring in another national IMT to mitigate span of control issues.
Getting snubbed in their previous request for help, Los Angeles County fire officials were not interested in seeing another federal team come on scene. They felt as though the first team had completely let them down when the fire pushed through their communities and their resources were stretched so thin.
After much discussion, federal officials ordered another national IMT even though Los Angeles County officials disagreed with this decision and felt that the responsibility for managing the incident should have remained with one of their own teams.
Upon arriving, the Incident Commander saw a critical need to coordinate efforts among his team and that of the Los Angeles County Fire Department. If he failed, the agenda of both agencies would suffer, and egos would get in the way of accomplishing the larger mission
The first priority was to persuade the Los Angeles County Deputy Chief that, after he had spent 32 hours on the fireline, the most important contribution the Deputy Chief could make was to get some much needed rest. A member of the Command Staff convinced the Deputy Chief to go home, get some rest, and allow the new team, which included several Los Angeles County firefighters, to devise a plan.
The Incident Commander invited the Deputy Chief to breakfast the following morning and encouraged him to bring his Chief. The team would be ready to lay out their plan. The Deputy Chief also received a promise that everyone would work together to find common ground and act in the best interest of the public as well as the national forest.
The next morning, the Los Angeles County contingent arrived at camp—the Chief and both Deputy Chiefs. The Incident Commander, along with the Operations Chief, mapped out their plan. The county fire officials were relieved to find that the plans were sound and that the team had taken the right factors into consideration.
The national team entered into unified command with county officials. The Incident Commander was successful in bringing the teams together in a cooperative effort quickly, and the fire was contained in a matter of days.
What could have been a dismal failure turned out to be a great success. Attitudes in the county did an about-face—from wanting to pull their firefighters from national IMTs to wanting to enter into unified command with them the next year after a firefighter fatality on an Los Angeles County incident.
The same Deputy Fire Chief, who had been skeptical of calling in the second IMT, ordered the help of that same national team after the fatality.
(Click here to download a copy of Leading in the Wildland Fire Service.)
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