Food for Thought

"Knowledge speaks, but wisdom listens." ~ Jimi Hendrix

Looking Out for Others: The Rapid Lesson Sharing Tool

Building resilient teams requires that we share what we learn with others. The 2014 Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation (Chapter 18 - Reviews and Investigations) encourages the use of Rapid Lesson Sharing (RLS) as a means by which "wildland fire and aviation managers assess and improve the effectiveness and safety of organizational operations."

Rapid Lesson Sharing (RLS) is a process for field personnel to quickly share lessons with others. RLS can be used to document and share lessons learned as a result of close calls, minor accidents, successes, efficient ways of performing work, adaptations, or anything wildland fire personnel can learn from.

To submit or view RLS documents, go to http://www.wildfirelessons.net/Resources/RapidLessonSharing

Food for Thought

"Future success is rarely built on the same platform as one's past accomplishments." ~ Amy Jen Su & Muriel Maignan Wilkins

Honor Through Learning - Dutch Creek

Dutch Creek Incident - July 25, 2008 

#HonorThroughLearning

(Andy Palmer; photo credit: National Park Service)

Incident Summary: On June 12, 2008, Andy Palmer graduates from high school. He completes Basic Firefighter training June 24th and Wildland Fire Chain Saw training (S-212) June 28th. He is hired as a seasonal firefighter on an engine crew June 29th and completes his A Faller taskbook on July 4th. July 22, 2008, the engine receives a resource order for the Iron Complex, California. The supervision at the park are motivated to see the engine crew obtain an assignment and call the crew in on their day off. The crew suffers a series of complications enroute to the fire including mechanical problems with the engine that lead to the eventual separation of the crew and engine captain after arriving at the incident. The remaining crew members are encouraged to pursue a line assignment as a falling team. The IMT personnel assign the crew as a falling module. During that assignment the crew cuts a tree that is outside their falling qualifications. A class C ponderosa pine is cut, falling downslope into a fire-damaged sugar pine. A portion of the sugar pine breaks off 

and falls upslope, hitting firefighter Andy Palmer, resulting in multiple severe injuries…and the loss of a firefighters’ life. It was Andy’s first fire assignment.

Zero Hour. July 25th, a radio transmission comes into Iron Complex dispatch: “Man Down Man Down. We need help. Medical emergency. Dozer pad. Broken leg. Bleeding. Drop Point 72 and dozer line. Call 911, we need help.”

The local sheriff’s office receives a call from incident command and begins inquiring for a helicopter. Two air medical services decline the mission due to poor visibility from smoke, California Highway Patrol’s helicopter was not available and the US Coast Guard (USCG) had not yet been contacted.

Other firefighters arrive on scene. Nomex shirts are used as pressure bandages on shoulder and leg injuries. The injured firefighter is reported as having severe bleeding and being conscious. The severity of the injuries and the sense of urgency are not communicated to paramedics dispatched in an ambulance to the incident.

As the medics arrive on scene they realize the injuries are much more serious than they had been told and decide to facilitate a rapid evacuation via carryout.

Fifty-five minutes since the accident. The patient is prepared to move and the decision is made to go to the ambulance rather than waiting for the helicopter. The ambulance is approximately 2000 ft down the dozer line.

One hour and 25 minutes since the accident. A third paramedic has arrived on scene and the decision is made to wait for the helicopter. Firefighters start clearing a zone for hoist extraction.

One hour and 50 minutes since the accident. Multiple delays of the USCG helicopter are caused due to poor communications of patient status, potential use of a Forest Service helicopter assigned to the fire, and method of extraction. Once the USCG is enroute, communication about the new extraction location, radio frequencies and patient status is an issue and slows the extrication efforts. While being transferred to the hoist basket, personnel on the ground report profuse bleeding. No patient care can be given while being hoisted.

Two hours and 47 minutes since the accident. During the flight, cardiac arrest treatment protocol is initiated and the helicopter lands at Redding Municipal Airport with CPR in progress.

Three hours and 26 minutes since the accident. An ER Physician pronounced time of death, via radio. The Coroner later determined that Andy Palmer’s death was caused by excessive blood loss.

LESSONS LEARNED DISCUSSION POINTS

• Identify and discuss a variety of options for medical evacuation (ATV, wheeled litter, etc.) anticipating that a helicopter will not be available.
• If the crewmember sitting beside you were to be seriously injured on the fireline, what would you and your crew do? How thorough is your unit or IMT's Incident Emergency Plan? Consider doing a mock-up medical evaucation from start to finish. Utilize the Medical Incident Report on page 108-109 of your IRPG to effectively communicate emergency information. Assess the drill with an AAR.

Additional Resources: 

• Factual Report: Dutch Creek Fatality
• Youtube Video - We Will Never Forget You: Remembering Andy Palmer

[Visit the 6 Minutes for Safety website for this and other topics.]

Food For Thought

"Leadership is not defined by your title--it's defined by your actions." ~ Disney Institute.

IGNITE the Spark for Leadership and "SHARE" throughout your sphere of influence.

How is Your SA?

Honor Through Learning -- Cramer Fire

CRAMER FIRE

Incident Summary: Central Idaho including the Salmon-Challis Nat’l Forest had been in a period of drought for the last 4 years. Spring and summer rainfall had lagged. 1630 July 20th a fire is reported in the area of Cramer Creek. Jumpers are dispatched and size up the Cramer Fire at 3 acres with high spread potential. High winds keep them from engaging the fire. Firefighters are flown in to a helispot (H1) on a ridge between Cramer and Cache Bar drainages, and due to fire behavior, do not engage the fire. The fire burns actively until 0230. By morning the fire is over 35 acres.

In addition to other air and ground resources, the Indianola helicopter H193 and Helitack crew report to the fire at 1515 on the 21st. By 1952 the fire is 200 acres. At 2000 fire intensity is reported to be low yet due to a thermal belt, the fire burns actively until 0300. Around 0930 the morning of the 22nd, H193 rappels two Helitack into a new helispot (H2) up the ridge from H1. Air attack reports fire perimeter is now over the ridge and in the Cache Bar drainage. The fire is now on both sides of the ridge that the helispots are on. Fire is active below H1. The Helitack are falling large trees on H2 to clear room for medium helicopters that had been ordered for a crew shuttle. H193 transitions to bucket work on H1 at 1127 and minutes later the firefighters on H1 pull back and retreat down the trail toward the river. 20 minutes later H1 is burned over. Fire activity is reported as “intense”.

By 1430 the fire in the Cache Bar drainage is an active fire front. At 1447 plans were made to remove the Helitack from H2. At 1500 the fire on both sides of the ridge begins to spread rapidly…Both helicopters assigned to the fire are at the helibase 15 minutes away for refueling and maintenance when the Helitack call for an immediate pick up. At 1505 they call again for immediate pickup. At 1509 they call for immediate pickup and report that they are fine just taking a lot of smoke. At 1513 the Helitack report fire and smoke below them and request immediate pickup. At 1519 Helitack contact helibase regarding status of helicopter. Arriving at the fire, the helicopter is unable to land due to smoke. Both rappellers leave H2 at 1520. At 1524 the Cache Bar drainage is fully involved in fire. The rappellers make final call for immediate pickup… Both firefighters die soon after.

 

History - The Salmon River Breaks area of the Salmon-Challis Nat’l Forest has a long history of entrapping firefighters; 161 to date. Steep slopes predispose areas to rollout and rapid, uphill fire growth commonly lending to extreme fire behavior and difficult suppression.

• How can information about an area’s fire history help your situational awareness?

Size up – Crews are informed at the July 22 morning briefing that conditions will be getting progressively warmer and drier than previous days. Temperatures surpass 100°F and set record highs. RH’s are 10-15%. Fuels in the Cache Bar drainage are short grass on the south aspects and nearly continuous fields of ceanothus on the north. Live fuel moistures are critically low and the Burn Index (BI) and Energy Release Component (ERC) indicate dangerous conditions.

• Based on the predicted weather and the fire information above, what are your concerns?
• How could you and your crew safely engage a fire in a similar situation? 

L – The investigation report states that there were no effective lookouts for the rappellers at H2.

• It is not uncommon to assign small squads to isolated tasks such as cutting helispots. The rappellers on H2 were clearing large trees to make a larger helispot. How would you and your crew maintain situational awareness of the fire and the felling operation at the same time? 

C – The rappellers were made aware of the low intensity fire in the Cache Bar drainage as soon as they were dropped off but the development of an active fire front in the Cache Bar drainage was observed by the lead plane and air attack 50 minutes before the fire reached H2. It was never communicated to them.

• What will you and your crew do during any fire assignment to get accurate information about current fire behavior?

E and S – There were no effective safety zones for the rappellers at H2 and once H1 below them burned over, the only way out was a helicopter.

• Helicopters have become a common resource on fires transporting us to and from remote fireline, delivering our food, water, supplies, and medevac. But what would you do if the helicopter couldn’t come? Discuss why depending on helicopters as an escape route is a bad idea?

Incident Complexities - On any incident, we may or may not be aware of problems with incident management effectiveness, adequacy of resources, or other big-picture details.

• Discuss how you and your crew will maintain safety without knowing these things.

Food for Thought

"Because duty can take our people into dangerous situations, fire leaders reciprocate their loyatly by looking out for their safety and well-being in all circumstances." ~ Leading in the Wildland Fire Service, p. 45

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Battlement Creek Fire, Colorado – July 17, 1976

It’s 1976 and western Colorado is experiencing an unusually severe fire season caused partly by unusual fuel conditions and heavy lightning activity during dry weather. A severe frost in June kills a high percentage of the leaves on Gambel oak which remain on the branches and is considered one of Colorado’s most flammable fuels. 10 hour fuels are at3-5%. A large scale high pressure weather pattern sits over western Colorado allowing for local weather to be influenced by terrain and diurnal winds averaging 10-15 mph in the afternoon with higher gusts. The weather is fair and hot with the temperatures at Grand Junction and Rifle reaching into the mid and upper 90’s. A fire is reported 40 miles northeast of Grand Junction, in the Battlement Creek drainage. The fire is burning over an elevation range of 6200-8400 ft on a steep west-facing slope.

Friday July 16, 0630, two hotshot crews from the Coconino NF Arizona arrive at the Battlement Creek fire. This is the seventeenth fire of the first season for the newly formed Mormon Lake Hotshot Crew. The strategy is to prevent western and southern spread. The crews begin a major burnout of the catline (dozer line) from the rocky bluffs (Point A) at about 1615, downhill along the catline toward the Battlement Creek road at the bottom (Point C) ending about 2030. The fire makes an uphill run in oak brush burning out a large portion of the drainage (from the road east to the ridge top) in about 20 minutes. Two “impressive” fire whirls are observed between 1600-1700. The night shift continues the burn out (Point C-D and beyond along the road) but is spotty with considerable unburned fuel remaining. Other night shift crews construct line along the ridge top (Point E to G). Based on Friday’s fire behavior, the E-G line is a crucial spot on the fire. Saturday July 17th, 0700, at morning briefing the Mormon Lake crew is assigned to burn out this section of line.

Saturday morning, July 17th - Due to a delay with the helicopter, the Mormon Lake crew does not get to the base of the rock bluff (Point E) until 1100. They are instructed to improve and burn out the line from the rocky bluff to the helispot (Point E-G). The burnout squad consisted of the crew boss, squad boss and 2 crewmembers. The rest of the crew is improving the handline down the ridge top.

At this same time another crew is burning out in the bottom of the draw (Point C-D). The draw burns readily, uphill toward the ridge and the Mormon Lake crew. Neither crew knew of the specific location or assignment of the other.

1400 - 1/3 the way from the rock bluff to the upper helispot, there is a noticeable increase in smoke from the draw below (where the other crew had been burning). The crew boss is instructed to speed up the line improvement squad on toward the safety zone (Point G) and to narrow down and speed up his burnout on down the ridgeline to join the remainder of the crew in the safety zone when his burnout was done. Upslope winds have increased to 25-35 mph.

1425-1440 – The line improvement squad just makes it into the safety zone when the flame front hits the ridge. 200 yards back, the burnout squad radios that they are “trapped”. Their escape is blocked by heavy smoke and flames.

1440 – 1445 – The squad removes their canvas vests to cover their head and face, moistened the vests and their clothes with water from their canteens, and lays face down in the mineral soil of the fireline.

1448 – All four firefighters are very badly burned.
Three will lose their lives

Discussion Points

The crew all wore aluminum hardhats, canvas vests, Nomex shirts and non-fire-resistant work pants. Fire shelters were not used. Fire shelters may have prevented serious burns and death at this incident. Policy on issuing and carrying shelters had not been established yet. This incident became the catalyst for the mandatory use of fire shelters and fire resistant clothing.

Action Item: Take this opportunity to inspect, repair or replace your PPE and fire shelter if needed to ensure that it protects you as well as possible

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the flyer.]

Leadership is Action - Digging a Little Deeper

Be sure to learn more about the Battlement Creek fire via the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program Staff Ride Library.

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Storm King: South Canyon 20th Anniversary

The South Canyon Fire forever changed how we approach wildfire. July 6, 1994, is a date that bonded many in a common loss, forever changed 14 families and shook communities with the loss of their finest. Storm King Mountain, just west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado, claimed 14 firefighters some 20 years ago. Twenty years, a blink in time to so many who lost so much that day.

Food for Thought

"Perhaps the greatest leaders are the ones that are never remembered as great leaders, but great teachers and role models." ~ Don Mercer and Carlos Fontana, "Follow to Lead"

IGNITE the Spark for Leadership and "SHARE" throughout your sphere of influence.

A Bias for Bold Action

A Bias for Bold Action

by Bob Schoultz

I was recently invited to provide a Navy SEAL’s perspective to a conference on risk management. As I was preparing my remarks, I realized that throughout my career in the Navy, “risk management” had been inherent in my duties as an officer and leader of audacious men in high risk operations, but I had never given the concept of risk management much thought. I felt a little like the fellow who was amazed to learn that he’d been speaking prose all his life and didn’t even know it!

In thinking about it, I realized how important risk management can be to proper planning and success, but also how, if given too much emphasis, it can inhibit bold action and throw sand into the gears of progress.

Risk management is certainly an important aspect of good planning and decision making – an organization should go into any endeavor with its eyes open, understanding what could go wrong and how to manage potential impacts. Careful consideration of risk can help determine whether a plan has a reasonable chance of success, and whether potential benefits justify likely or even unlikely costs. All of that is indisputable.

But an over-emphasis on risk management can torpedo one of the most important factors in any plan’s success: Bold, confident commitment to a plan. Too much attention to risk management can focus an organization on all that can go wrong, rather than on what should go well and what bold action is required to ensure that it does.

A focus on risk can infect a team’s confidence, and over-caution can lead to inaction, or taking half steps, or playing not-to-lose. We’ve heard the catchphrase to: “Always hedge your bets,” and cautious admonitions to be prudent, play it safe, don’t expose yourself, leave yourself a way out, never over-commit. This can be practical advice – especially to ensure you get at least “half a loaf.” But, while the careful approach may sometimes be wise to ensure survival, it won’t promote bold, audacious action. And it won’t inspire subordinates to truly commit to a plan.

In their seminal book, In Search of Excellence, Peters and Waterman repeatedly found that great corporations had what they called “a bias for action.” They noted that “The most important and visible outcropping of the action bias in excellent companies is their willingness to try things out, to experiment…..Most big institutions… prefer analysis and debate to trying something out, and they are paralyzed by fear of failure, however small.” This was true 30 years ago, and it remains true today.

When I was serving at the Naval Academy, I presented an out-of-the-box proposal to then- Superintendent Vice Admiral Rod Rempt, to create an opportunity for midshipmen to participate in National Outdoor Leadership School courses during the summer. He responded that he didn’t think it was a good idea, that it didn’t fit, we’d never done anything like this before, midshipmen already had more options than they could manage, etc., but then he said (and I’ll never forget) “What the hell – let’s give it a try! How can I help?” Ten years later, over a quarter of midshipmen choose to challenge themselves for 24 days in the wilderness with NOLS every summer, and I give Rod Rempt a lot of the credit for his willingness to take a chance and support a subordinate leader’s initiative.

The bold leader inspires subordinates to believe in themselves, their team, their strategy, and their ability to get results. Subordinates know a risky plan when they see it, and it’s important that they trust that their leaders have competently weighed the risks involved, and share in that risk. But it is more important that they know their leaders are confident and committed to the success of the plan, and are ready to commit boldly to its execution – in spite of the risks. History is full of examples of committed and confident teams succeeding where success was deemed unlikely or impossible; there are also innumerable examples of timid leaders and teams snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Napoleon pointed out that in war, morale is to material as three is to one.

But there can be a fine line between being bold and audacious, and being blind and fool-hardy. The motto of the Navy Seabees is “Can Do,” but they also say “Too much ‘Can-Do’ can do you in.” John Wayne once said, “Life is tough. It’s even tougher when you’re stupid.” But I’m arguing against risk managers injecting too much “Can’t Do” into vision and planning.

Great leaders have a bias for bold action, but prudently manage risk. Excellent managers on the other hand, are expected to be the voice of prudence and caution, to be their organization’s risk managers, while still leaving room for experimentation and well-calculated audacity. In my own career, I have played the role of the cautious manager, raising red flags when (what I perceived to be) irresponsible and dangerous ideas were being proposed and considered. I have also been the bold, aggressive leader who my team routinely had to rein in, to make sure we didn’t get out in front of our own headlights. When the balance is right between bold but prudent leaders, and cautious but confident managers, there are few limits to what an organization can accomplish.

I was recently asked to speak on how great leaders and teams respond to chaos and uncertainty. In my remarks, I noted that bold leaders know that while chaos and uncertainty are dangerous and warrant caution, they also present great opportunities. The bold, aggressive leader will carefully watch chaos, staying alert, agile, ready to neutralize threats, but also ready to strike when opportunities present themselves. While the bold leader is wary of the danger inherent in chaos, s/he keeps the front site focused on opportunity.

When the going gets tough, the bold leader stays focused on opportunity. Chesty Puller, when told that the Chinese had him and his Marines surrounded in Korea, is reputed to have responded: “That simplifies the problem. The bastards can’t get away from us now!” He didn’t (as far as I know) then ask his staff for a risk management plan. But a good chief of staff would have prepared one for him anyway!

“The credit belongs to the man who strives valiantly; who spends himself in a worthy cause… who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid who neither know victory nor defeat.” (Teddy Roosevelt, adjusted slightly…)

Manage risk, but always with a bias for bold action.

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The WFLDP would like to thank Bob Schoultz, retired Navy Seal commander and certified  L-380 instructor for NOLS, for allowing us to reprint his blog post. Check out other articles on Bob's blog, "Bob Schoultz's Corner."

Food for Thought

"Followers who tell the truth, and leaders who listen to it, are an unbeatable combination." ~ Warren Bennis

Building the Resilient Team - An Idaho Example

(Photo credit: Steve Hayward, Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security)

The Bureau of Land Management's Idaho Falls District Fire Management crews and overhead took part in what has become an annual large-scale training exercise in conjunction with the Upper Snake Interagency Wildfire Group (USIWG).

(Photo credit: Steve Hayward, Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security)

The exercise took place on Saturday, June 28, in Menan, Idaho. Approximately 12 federal, state and local fire and law enforcement agencies and over 80 personnel took part in the exercise.

(Photo credit: Steve Hayward, Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security)

Crews rotated through four stations, including a sand table exercise focused on setting up a unified command for an escalating wildland-urban interface incident that included a cost share discussion. Other stations focused on setting up tactical interoperability radio kits to facilitate radio communications, structure triage and protection, and an emergency medical incident.

(Photo credit: Steve Hayward, Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security)

Contact: Kevin Conran at 208-524-7602

Food for Thought

"Leadership is a choice. It is not a rank." ~ Simon Sinek

IGNITE the Spark for Leadership and "SHARE" throughout your sphere of influence. 

"Lone Survivor" Comes to Leadership in Cinema

To culminate our 2014 National Fireline Reading Challenge, we are teaming up with the Leadership in Cinema program to dig a little deeper. We challenge students of fire to watch the movie "Lone Survivor" and compare and contrast the book with the movie.

Leadership is Action - Dig a Little Deeper Facilitation Resources

• Ben Eby, Leadership in Cinema program steward, created a "Lone Survivor" lesson plan to make facilitation easy. Ben included some great video resources within his lesson plan. Be sure to check them out.
• Bob Schoultz, former Navy SEAL and L-380 instructor for NOLS, shares his thoughts on the book versus the movie on his blog.

Food for Thought

"Followers assess their leader's integrity every day. If people believe a leader has integrity, they can accept other weaknesses and help compensate for them." ~ "Leading in the Wildland Fire Service, p. 59

"LIKE" if you agree. IGNITE the Spark for Leadership and "SHARE" throughout your sphere of influence.

Day 7: Remembering Those Lost on Storm King Mountain

DAY 7: REMEMBERING THOSE THAT LOST THEIR LIVES ON STORM KING MOUNTAIN - 20 YEARS AGO TODAY

There is no question that the loss of firefighter’s lives deeply affects us all, but when we realize just how many burnovers and deployments and aircraft accidents and felling injuries have happened, we need to ask ourselves “are we learning anything?”

Are we getting better? Has anything really changed? When the wildland fire community suffered the terrible loss of 14 firefighters on the South Canyon Fire, it became the catalyst for change. It changed us and how we manage fire. Listed below are some of the changes…each one honoring the losses on Storm King Mountain 20 years ago today.

• Safety – Fire training was reviewed to include lessons learned and greater emphasis on safety
• Safety – Emergence of hot shot crews as safety leaders at the field level. Right to refuse an assignment.
• Leadership Curriculum - The accident planted the seeds for the leadership curriculum.
• Human Factors – Recognition of the importance of attitudes and human behavior in accidents.
• Lessons Learned Center – The 1998 Tri-Data study recommended that the wildland fire service look into building a lessons learned center. The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center was created in 2002.
• Fire shelters – The development of a more effective fire shelter started with this incident.
• Fire shelter training – Develop and refresh yearly on fire shelters. Clarify deployment vs safety zones.
• Predictive Services – Recommendations to integrate fire weather meteorology with fire behavior forecasting at the geographic coordination center level evolved into the development of the predictive services units we have today
• Fire Weather Forecasting – Better communication of fire weather forecasts to incidents, improvements to the red flag and spot weather programs.
• Interpretation of NFDRS products for field use: Pocket Cards and other tools for understanding the effect of fire danger and drought on firefighter safety.
• Agency administrators – Greater involvement of agency leaders in emphasis on firefighter safety.
• Fire policy reviews - Review of National fire policy. Media interest in fire policy and fire management.
• Fire decision making – Changes were recommended to decision making process (the EFSA and fire complexity)
• Qualifications standards - The 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy and Program Review, signed by both Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, directed Federal wildland fire agencies to establish fire management qualifications standards to improve firefighter safety and increase professionalism in fire management programs.

Discussion Questions

• What changes would you like to see in the wake of the Yarnell Hill Fire? 
• Based on events like Yarnell Hill and South Canyon, what can you and your crew do differently?

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the flyer.]

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Storm King 14

Day 6: My Safety...Who's Really in Charge?

DAY 6: MY SAFETY...WHO'S REALLY IN CHARGE?
Written by Tim Blake
NWCG Preparedness Branch Coordinator

“I recently attended a “Safety Summit” to help develop a Strategic Safety Plan. The question was asked, “Who’s responsible for safety?” Management? Leadership? Supervisors?

To answer this question, I reflected on an “awakening” moment for me and felt a shot of adrenaline surge through me and couldn’t be still. Typically I’m quiet in meetings, but this topic touched my soul and I couldn’t hold back.

I reflected on my basic fire school training where I was taught to work hard, keep my head down, and dig…I was very young, up for the task, and “all in.” Exciting stuff!

My first fire was a hike in, lightning struck Ponderosa Pine snag high on a ridge. We made the climb, and I did as instructed; head down, dig and work hard. My squad boss was “looking out for me” as I mopped under this huge snag and I stirred and mixed the embers.

I had an uncomfortable feeling inside but was determined to prove myself as a firefighter. I didn’t like being under a big snag on fire, but went with my training and watched my squad boss. Suddenly, an overwhelming force launched me off my feet and I dove downhill. The top of the snag had fallen and miraculously missed me by inches. I broke two fingers in the dive but am very grateful to be alive!

So, the lesson I learned through this experience, and to answer the original question, is that I am absolutely in charge of my own safety. Keeping myself alive is something I cannot delegate to someone else. I must listen to that “feeling” and react. We work as a team and take care of each other, but definitely speak up if something doesn’t feel right.

YOU are ultimately in charge of your safety.”

Discussion Questions~There will be situations where you lack experience and must rely on someone with more experience. What's the balance between self-reliance and deference to expertise?
~As a leader, how do you encourage your people to think for themselves yet work as team?

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the flyer.]

Food For Thought

"May we all be energized and inspired to be ever aware of the lessons learned from their sacrifice." ~ South Canyon Fire Investigation, August 1994

Day 5: Honoring Our Fallen Aviation Personnel

DAY 5: TODAY WE HONOR THOSE WE HAVE LOST IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM YOU AND WILL NOT FORGET

Almost all firefighters will interact with aircraft on fires…bucket drops, blivets, sling loads of supplies, crew shuttles, reconnaissance, medevac, retardant drops from SEATs and tankers, and air attack. Due to its heavy use for fire logistics and operations, aviation remains one of the highest risk activities that a firefighter will be exposed to. Have we improved? Yes. Are aircraft still crashing? Yes. Are we still killing pilots and firefighters? Yes. Can we do something about it? YES!

Get the right training and maintain currency: Beyond the S-classes and fire aviation qualifications, there are many A-classes offered by IAT (Interagency Aviation Training) that may or may not be required (depends on your agency) and cover content that can be very helpful to someone trying to gain a better understanding of aviation. There are classes on Airspace, Aircraft Radio Use, Automated Flight Following, Water Ditching and much more! Some are taught in the classroom, some by webinar, and some online. Check it out!

Be as informed as possible: Did you know that a recent Accident Prevention Bulletin on rotor strikes states the USFS and DOI had over 60 rotor strikes reported in the past 10 years with 7 fatalities from 4 separate accidents? If you work with helicopters wouldn’t you be interested in why this was happening and how to prevent it? This Office of Aviation Services (OAS) webpage has a long list of safety-related bulletins. You can also query SAFECOM to see what is being reported in your area, type of aircraft or mission or an incident that you are going to.

Learn from the Past: There are many aviation lessons that have been learned from “blood and bent metal” that can help us work with aviation more safely. You can learn about DOI and USFS accidents and near misses from these annual accident review PowerPoints.

Understand the capabilities and limitations of each air resource: For example…should you consider Air Attack an aerial lookout? Why do you want to clear firefighters off the line for a retardant drop? What is the best way to describe a target to an aerial resource? Find out these answers and a lot more with this WFSTAR video from the 2009 fire refresher.

Limit exposure: Limit the amount of time that a helicopter has to hover and the amount of time you are in, under and around them. This WFSTAR video from the 2010 fire refresher talks in depth about how to limit your exposure and reduce the risk of working with and around aircraft on fires. Limiting exposure also means asking yourself “is this flight necessary?” and “is there a better way to do it?”.

Communicate: Ground crews must assess hazards at the helispot/drop zone and communicate potential hazards to the flight crew/pilot. It is easy to trust the people that work around aviation all the time, but trust your gut feeling also. If it looks wrong or feels wrong it might very well BE wrong. Say something! “Communicate” also means that If you don’t know, ask.

Don’t settle for “well we’ve always done it this way.” For example…Just this year, the way some SEATs (single engine air tankers) track flight time was changed. Before, pilots would call roll time which violated sterile cock pit. Now flight time is measured block to block.

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the interactive flyer, http://www.wildfirelessons.net/6minutesforsafety]

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Happy Independence Day

Our thoughts go out to all those staffing the line this holiday weekend. We recognize your sacrifice and appreciate your service now and always. We honor those who can no longer celebrate with us or their families. We will never forget!

SHARE within your sphere of influence.

Day 4: Towards Better Decisions on the Fireline

“Improving wildland firefighter performance under stressful, risky conditions: Towards better decisions on the fireline and more resilient organizations”

DAY 4: TOWARDS BETTER DECISIONS ON THE FIRELINE

It’s not uncommon to find some element of human factors being discussed in a training venue these days. We talk often on and off the line about situation awareness, decision making, slides and leadership concepts. This was not always the case; this shift in our culture was inspired by the tragic events of July 6, 1994, and the loss of 14 firefighters on the South Canyon fire. 

The foundation for this movement towards introspection and the increased emphasis of the individual firefighter was a brought about greatly by a 5-day workshop held in Missoula, MT in June 1995 called nothing other than The Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop.

In November that same year MTDC, released the findings from the workshop that became the single most culturally influential document of the time. “The goal of the workshop was not to come up with quick solutions. Rather to explore the human issues of wildland firefighting and make recommendations to management for corrective actions that would have lasting effects.”

The first several days of the workshop focused on the psychological, cultural and organizational aspects of firefighting and concluded with a guided tour of Mann Gulch. Experts from various backgrounds introduced participants to new models such as Highly Reliable Organizations (HRO), Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPD), and Crew Resource Management (CRM). These models would eventually become the foundation for the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program curriculum and set in motion a cultural paradigm shift.  Though many great findings and recommendations where derived from the workshop, the following are excerpts from CRM adapted for fire.

Decision Making

• Cross-check information sources.
• Anticipate consequences of decisions.
• Use data to generate alternatives.
• Gather pertinent data before making a decision.
• Evaluate information and assess resources.
• Identify alternatives and contingencies.
• Provide rationale for decision.
• Acknowledge communication. 
• Repeat information.
• Reply with a question or comment.
• Use nonverbal communication appropriately.

 Leadership

• Determine tasks to be assigned.
• Establish procedures to monitor and assess the crew.
• Inform the crew members of fire assignment progress.
• Verbalize plans.
• Discuss ways to improve performance.
• Ask for input; discuss problems.
• Tell crew members what to do.
• Reallocate work in a dynamic situation.
• Focus crew attention to task.
• Provide a legitimate avenue for dissent.
• Provide feedback to crew on performance.

Adaptability/Flexibility

• Alter fire plans to meet situation demands.
• Alter behavior to meet situation demands.
• Accept constructive criticism and help.
• Step in and help other crew members.
• Be receptive to others’ ideas.

Assertiveness

• Advocate a specific course of action.
• State opinions on decisions and procedures even to higher-ranking crew member.
• Ask questions when uncertain.
• Make suggestions.
• Raise questions about procedures.

Situation Awareness

• Identify problems/potential problems.
• Recognize the need for action.
• Attempt to determine why discrepancies exist with information before proceeding.
• Provide information in advance.
• Demonstrate ongoing awareness of fire assignment status.
• Demonstrate awareness of your own task performance.
• Note deviations.

Mission Analysis

• Define tasks based on fire assignment.
• Structure strategies, tactics, and objectives.
• Identify potential impact of unplanned events on a fire.
• Critique existing plans.
• Devise contingency plans.
• Question/seek information, data, and ideas related to fire plan.

Discussion

1. What information above can you apply today?
2. How can you make this information relevant in every operation?
3. Is some of the above information new or unfamiliar?

Leadership is Action - Putting It Into Practice

• Read Findings from the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop for yourself to discover more valuable information.
• Write a blog with your perspective and submit to BLM_FA_Leadership_Feedback@blm.gov for possible publication on the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program blog.

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Thanks to Heath Cota, District FMO on the Sawtooth National Forest and member of the NWCG Leadership Subcommittee, for this 6 Minutes for Safety entry. Heath has functional responsibility for LEAD Time.