Storm King 14

Day 6: My Safety...Who's Really in Charge?

DAY 6: MY SAFETY...WHO'S REALLY IN CHARGE?
Written by Tim Blake
NWCG Preparedness Branch Coordinator

“I recently attended a “Safety Summit” to help develop a Strategic Safety Plan. The question was asked, “Who’s responsible for safety?” Management? Leadership? Supervisors?

To answer this question, I reflected on an “awakening” moment for me and felt a shot of adrenaline surge through me and couldn’t be still. Typically I’m quiet in meetings, but this topic touched my soul and I couldn’t hold back.

I reflected on my basic fire school training where I was taught to work hard, keep my head down, and dig…I was very young, up for the task, and “all in.” Exciting stuff!

My first fire was a hike in, lightning struck Ponderosa Pine snag high on a ridge. We made the climb, and I did as instructed; head down, dig and work hard. My squad boss was “looking out for me” as I mopped under this huge snag and I stirred and mixed the embers.

I had an uncomfortable feeling inside but was determined to prove myself as a firefighter. I didn’t like being under a big snag on fire, but went with my training and watched my squad boss. Suddenly, an overwhelming force launched me off my feet and I dove downhill. The top of the snag had fallen and miraculously missed me by inches. I broke two fingers in the dive but am very grateful to be alive!

So, the lesson I learned through this experience, and to answer the original question, is that I am absolutely in charge of my own safety. Keeping myself alive is something I cannot delegate to someone else. I must listen to that “feeling” and react. We work as a team and take care of each other, but definitely speak up if something doesn’t feel right.

YOU are ultimately in charge of your safety.”

Discussion Questions~There will be situations where you lack experience and must rely on someone with more experience. What's the balance between self-reliance and deference to expertise?
~As a leader, how do you encourage your people to think for themselves yet work as team?

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the flyer.]

Food For Thought

"May we all be energized and inspired to be ever aware of the lessons learned from their sacrifice." ~ South Canyon Fire Investigation, August 1994

Day 5: Honoring Our Fallen Aviation Personnel

DAY 5: TODAY WE HONOR THOSE WE HAVE LOST IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM YOU AND WILL NOT FORGET

Almost all firefighters will interact with aircraft on fires…bucket drops, blivets, sling loads of supplies, crew shuttles, reconnaissance, medevac, retardant drops from SEATs and tankers, and air attack. Due to its heavy use for fire logistics and operations, aviation remains one of the highest risk activities that a firefighter will be exposed to. Have we improved? Yes. Are aircraft still crashing? Yes. Are we still killing pilots and firefighters? Yes. Can we do something about it? YES!

Get the right training and maintain currency: Beyond the S-classes and fire aviation qualifications, there are many A-classes offered by IAT (Interagency Aviation Training) that may or may not be required (depends on your agency) and cover content that can be very helpful to someone trying to gain a better understanding of aviation. There are classes on Airspace, Aircraft Radio Use, Automated Flight Following, Water Ditching and much more! Some are taught in the classroom, some by webinar, and some online. Check it out!

Be as informed as possible: Did you know that a recent Accident Prevention Bulletin on rotor strikes states the USFS and DOI had over 60 rotor strikes reported in the past 10 years with 7 fatalities from 4 separate accidents? If you work with helicopters wouldn’t you be interested in why this was happening and how to prevent it? This Office of Aviation Services (OAS) webpage has a long list of safety-related bulletins. You can also query SAFECOM to see what is being reported in your area, type of aircraft or mission or an incident that you are going to.

Learn from the Past: There are many aviation lessons that have been learned from “blood and bent metal” that can help us work with aviation more safely. You can learn about DOI and USFS accidents and near misses from these annual accident review PowerPoints.

Understand the capabilities and limitations of each air resource: For example…should you consider Air Attack an aerial lookout? Why do you want to clear firefighters off the line for a retardant drop? What is the best way to describe a target to an aerial resource? Find out these answers and a lot more with this WFSTAR video from the 2009 fire refresher.

Limit exposure: Limit the amount of time that a helicopter has to hover and the amount of time you are in, under and around them. This WFSTAR video from the 2010 fire refresher talks in depth about how to limit your exposure and reduce the risk of working with and around aircraft on fires. Limiting exposure also means asking yourself “is this flight necessary?” and “is there a better way to do it?”.

Communicate: Ground crews must assess hazards at the helispot/drop zone and communicate potential hazards to the flight crew/pilot. It is easy to trust the people that work around aviation all the time, but trust your gut feeling also. If it looks wrong or feels wrong it might very well BE wrong. Say something! “Communicate” also means that If you don’t know, ask.

Don’t settle for “well we’ve always done it this way.” For example…Just this year, the way some SEATs (single engine air tankers) track flight time was changed. Before, pilots would call roll time which violated sterile cock pit. Now flight time is measured block to block.

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the interactive flyer, http://www.wildfirelessons.net/6minutesforsafety]

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Happy Independence Day

Our thoughts go out to all those staffing the line this holiday weekend. We recognize your sacrifice and appreciate your service now and always. We honor those who can no longer celebrate with us or their families. We will never forget!

SHARE within your sphere of influence.

Day 4: Towards Better Decisions on the Fireline

“Improving wildland firefighter performance under stressful, risky conditions: Towards better decisions on the fireline and more resilient organizations”

DAY 4: TOWARDS BETTER DECISIONS ON THE FIRELINE

It’s not uncommon to find some element of human factors being discussed in a training venue these days. We talk often on and off the line about situation awareness, decision making, slides and leadership concepts. This was not always the case; this shift in our culture was inspired by the tragic events of July 6, 1994, and the loss of 14 firefighters on the South Canyon fire. 

The foundation for this movement towards introspection and the increased emphasis of the individual firefighter was a brought about greatly by a 5-day workshop held in Missoula, MT in June 1995 called nothing other than The Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop.

In November that same year MTDC, released the findings from the workshop that became the single most culturally influential document of the time. “The goal of the workshop was not to come up with quick solutions. Rather to explore the human issues of wildland firefighting and make recommendations to management for corrective actions that would have lasting effects.”

The first several days of the workshop focused on the psychological, cultural and organizational aspects of firefighting and concluded with a guided tour of Mann Gulch. Experts from various backgrounds introduced participants to new models such as Highly Reliable Organizations (HRO), Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPD), and Crew Resource Management (CRM). These models would eventually become the foundation for the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program curriculum and set in motion a cultural paradigm shift.  Though many great findings and recommendations where derived from the workshop, the following are excerpts from CRM adapted for fire.

Decision Making

• Cross-check information sources.
• Anticipate consequences of decisions.
• Use data to generate alternatives.
• Gather pertinent data before making a decision.
• Evaluate information and assess resources.
• Identify alternatives and contingencies.
• Provide rationale for decision.
• Acknowledge communication. 
• Repeat information.
• Reply with a question or comment.
• Use nonverbal communication appropriately.

 Leadership

• Determine tasks to be assigned.
• Establish procedures to monitor and assess the crew.
• Inform the crew members of fire assignment progress.
• Verbalize plans.
• Discuss ways to improve performance.
• Ask for input; discuss problems.
• Tell crew members what to do.
• Reallocate work in a dynamic situation.
• Focus crew attention to task.
• Provide a legitimate avenue for dissent.
• Provide feedback to crew on performance.

Adaptability/Flexibility

• Alter fire plans to meet situation demands.
• Alter behavior to meet situation demands.
• Accept constructive criticism and help.
• Step in and help other crew members.
• Be receptive to others’ ideas.

Assertiveness

• Advocate a specific course of action.
• State opinions on decisions and procedures even to higher-ranking crew member.
• Ask questions when uncertain.
• Make suggestions.
• Raise questions about procedures.

Situation Awareness

• Identify problems/potential problems.
• Recognize the need for action.
• Attempt to determine why discrepancies exist with information before proceeding.
• Provide information in advance.
• Demonstrate ongoing awareness of fire assignment status.
• Demonstrate awareness of your own task performance.
• Note deviations.

Mission Analysis

• Define tasks based on fire assignment.
• Structure strategies, tactics, and objectives.
• Identify potential impact of unplanned events on a fire.
• Critique existing plans.
• Devise contingency plans.
• Question/seek information, data, and ideas related to fire plan.

Discussion

1. What information above can you apply today?
2. How can you make this information relevant in every operation?
3. Is some of the above information new or unfamiliar?

Leadership is Action - Putting It Into Practice

• Read Findings from the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop for yourself to discover more valuable information.
• Write a blog with your perspective and submit to BLM_FA_Leadership_Feedback@blm.gov for possible publication on the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program blog.

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Thanks to Heath Cota, District FMO on the Sawtooth National Forest and member of the NWCG Leadership Subcommittee, for this 6 Minutes for Safety entry. Heath has functional responsibility for LEAD Time.

 

Take "5 at 2"

What is Take 5 @ 2? Where did it come from? What does it mean?

Recently, the folks that build the Wildland Fire Safety Annual Refresher (WFSTAR) modules (Annual Fire Refresher) took a deeper look into statistics of historical burnover fires. Some surprising trends came out of this analysis. One trend was the timeframe of fire blowups and burnovers. Of twenty (20) fatal burnover fires, fifteen (15) of them occured within the timeframe of 1400-1630. This should not surprise experienced firefighters much, as this timeframe is during the hottest, driest part of the day...when fires can blow up quicker and faster. Although not a surprise, 1400 could be an appropriate time to take a tactical pause, remember that this is the beginning of the most dangerous part of the day for fighting fires, and reflect upon those that have lost their lives due to burnovers.

Be sure to check out the WFSTAR video below. The Instructor Guide and Student Workbook as well as other informative lessons are available on the WFSTAR website.

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Day 3: Learning from the Nuttall Fire Shelter Deployment - 10 Years Ago Today

DAY 3: LEARNING FROM THE NUTTALL FIRE SHELTER DEPLOYMENT - 10 YEARS AGO TODAY

On July 2, 2004, Coronado National Forest, a firing group, consisting of four Hotshot crews, two medics and a Firing Group Supervisor, was assigned to Division E to contain a 7 acre slop-over which occurred above H4 and to assess firing needs between the slop-over and H4 . A portion of DIV E had been fired the previous evening and DIV E resources worked late the previous night and were required to mitigate work/rest on the morning of July 2. The two firing group medics were staged on the upper end of the line close to DP 20 rather than committing them down the steep line. That morning, two helitack crew members were inserted, by helicopter, on H4 without the knowledge of either the Firing Group Supervisor or the DIV E Supervisor.

The incident structure protection group which was installing hoselays in support of slop-over containment, as well as Plumas and Lassen IHC’s which were working the upper end of the slop-over, were directed to hike out based on observations of significant increases in fire activity and intensity.

After mitigating work/rest and participating in a 10 AM briefing, the DIV E Supervisor, DIV E medics, Safety Officer, and the Superintendent from the Mt. Taylor IHC began hiking down the DIV E line toward H4. All other crews assigned to the division remained at DP20 while DIV E Supervisor tied in with Firing Group Supervisor at a lookout point above H4.

Flagstaff and Augusta IHC’s moved out to the main line after completing the slop-over handline, preparing to burn the main line down to H4. When a downhill crown run into the drainage below H4 was reported by the Flagstaff IHC Captain, both crews were directed to immediately make their way to H4. Within minutes, the fire made a rapid uphill run to H4 which cut off the two crews from H4. They reversed course, moving upslope back into the slopover. During the hike back to the slop-over, a member of the Flagstaff IHC became incapacitated from a heat stress-related illness and was evacuated to the slopover by members of the Flagstaff and Augusta IHC’s.

Members of Flagstaff IHC at H4 fired all vegetation around the helispot. There were 13 firefighters on the helispot at the time the fire made its first run at H4. The Firing Group Supervisor could not make contact with Augusta and used a trail on the lee-side of the ridge (short-cut trail) to access the slop-over from H4. Upon meeting the crews in the slop-over he was informed of the crewmember injury and the inability to move the individual through the black up to DP 20 due to the steepness of the slope. Remaining pockets of receptive
fuel around the slop-over were burned.

Based on ember/ash fallout and heavy acrid smoke conditions –the Flagstaff Superintendent ordered the other 11 individuals including the 2 helitack crewmembers at H4 to deploy their shelters while he ensured everyone remained in place. None of the 12 firefighters sustained injury.

Once the heat dissipated enough, the Firing Group Supervisor hiked to H4 and then returned to the aspen grove with the paramedic assigned to DIV E and the Division E Supervisor, who was also a paramedic. At the aspen grove the ill crewmember received ALS treatment for heat exhaustion and once Plumas IHC cleared the trail from below DP 20 down to the aspen grove the crewmember was carried via stokes litter to DP20 and transferred to a waiting ambulance.

Discussion Topics

• The South Canyon, Cramer and Nuttall fires all involved helitack personnel deploying shelters at or near their Helispot. What information do you need prior to being inserted into a remote helispot? What questions may be deferred until landing at the helispot? Should the helicopter ever be considered the “E” in LCES? 
• Helitack are often inserted onto helispots during suppression activities to support logistical missions. What are the communication responsibilities between fireline supervision and helitack? Where should they be shown on an Incident Action Plan? Do they report to the Division Supervisor or Air Support? 
• On July 2, the Firing Group Supervisor staged his medics because of terrain and fitness concerns; the DIV E supervisor brought his medics down to H4 to support the evening burn operation planned from H4 to H5. Because of their physical fitness level, the DIV E medics could not be sent back up the escape route at the same time as Plumas and Lassen which added two inexperienced people at H4. The medics, however, played a critical role in stabilizing the injured IHC crewmember and provided ALS treatment promptly. Do you have a plan and the equipment to provide ALS treatment and extract the patient to an ambulance when aircraft cannot be used? What are your units SOP/Rules of Engagement for medical treatment and emergency transportation? 

LEADERSHIP IS ACTION - PUTTING IT INTO PRACTICE
Read the Nuttall Comples Fire Shelter Deployment Review.

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the flyer.]

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Day 2: How Can We Learn from the Past?

DAY TWO: HOW CAN WE LEARN FROM THE PAST?

"Accident Reports – Go Read Some"
(Travis Dotson, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center )

Why Read a Report? The whole idea of reading a report is to put yourself in the shoes of the decision makers and gain some insight and operational “slides” to deposit in your bank of experience. Right? OK, so this may not be the case for everyone. But the majority of the
reports are written with the idea that someone will learn from knowing the details of the event. Does that happen? Are we learning?

I came up in a fire culture that taught me to read incident reports and then sit around saying: “What were they thinking?” “They screwed up,” and “I would never get caught in that situation.” Did I learn anything from those “not me” sessions? Or, did I just convince myself
that I was not in any danger because “I know better”? Monday morning quarterback perhaps? (The academic term is “hindsight bias.” Look it up.)

So the question remains: Why read a report? How do we learn from it? In this instance, learning consists of changing your behavior. Read a report, go to a fire, operate differently because you read a report. Is that real? I don’t know. But I think it’s possible.

Think About It! I’ve read a lot of “Hit by Tree” reports. I’m terrified of getting smashed by a tree (or someone else getting smashed on my watch). But has my behavior changed? It never did until I consciously said to myself: “This could be me. What am I going to do differently?”

I now put much more thought into the exposure involved in what I ask others to do. Do I hold myself to that same standard? I do when I inquire of myself: “Would I ask someone else to do this?” I didn’t always think this way.

I’m still not “out of the woods” (HA!) on this one. I still might get smashed by a tree, but I’d like to think I will expose myself and others to that potential a whole lot less—and mitigate what I can when I am exposed. Think about it!

So, read some of these reports. Be aware of the existence of hindsight bias. Consciously think about whether or not you are learning anything (will you change behavior?). I’m just throwing it out there. Dig on tool swingers (and look up every now and then).

[This article was originally published by the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center 2011 Summer edition of Two More Chains.]

[Visit 6 Minutes for Safety to download the flyer.]

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A Legacy of Leaders: Beyond South Canyon and Yarnell

A LEGACY OF LEADERS: 

SOUTH CANYON AND YARNELL

by Rowdy Muir

The 20^th anniversary of South Canyon has caused me to reflect on the events that occurred on the mountain of Storm King and how they relate to Yarnell Hill. How did our wildland fire community get through those tough times 20 years ago; how will we get beyond Yarnell?