Honoring Our Fallen Through Learning - Point Fire

On November 30, 2023, members of the BLM Fire Operations Group (FOG) and Engine Subcommittee visited the site of the 1995 Point Fire to honor fallen Kuna volunteer firefighters Bill Buttram and Josh Oliver. 

Stepping Back to Step Forward and Build the Team

(Photo: George Risko)

As I reflect on recent events, my focus rests on two groups—the heroes and family we have lost and the storytellers. (I have much love and respect for both.) I have had time to reflect upon a question I was asked early in my career—how do we pass the hard lessons on in our culture so others may be spared a similar tragedy.

Remembering Mann Gulch While On Higgins Ridge

(Photo: Montana PBS)

In a remote area of Idaho in the early 1960s, 20 smokejumpers found themselves in a challenging situation. Thanks to a heroic effort, and as mentioned by the survivors interviewed, leadership and the lessons from Mann Gulch saved lives. 

Wildland Fire Leadership Challenge - Digging a Little Deeper

• Watch Montana PBS's documentary Higgins Ridge.

• Reflect upon the following questions:
• What are you doing in your organizations to share lessons? 
• Is leadership a part of your culture?

---

Do you have any ideas or questions about experiential learning or other tools within the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Toolbox, please reach out to us today. Click here for the WFLDP roster. 

Remembering Mann Gulch

(Photo: George Risko)

For years, the wildland fire service has conducted staff rides using military events. This year the roles reversed a bit and members of the 2nd Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment participated in the Mann Gulch Staff Ride. National Wildfire Coordinating Group partners from the Florida Forest Service and U.S. Forest Service,  collaborated with personnel from the Helena National Forest to walk the Rangers through the staff ride process. We are excited to tell you about the learning experience in future blogs as we prepare for the 75th anniversary of the Mann Gulch Fire which took the lives of 13 smokejumpers. Until then, take a moment to reflect upon the event using some of the same materials the Rangers used to prepare for their learning opportunity.

IGNITE: Without Action...

Without it [action], thought can never ripen into truth. - Ralph Waldo Emerson

[Photo: Lunch spot/Mann Gulch 1949/USFS]

WOR 2022 - Day 4

It is clear that fire will continue to be an important resource-management tool. But it's a tool as delicate to manipulate as a surgeon's scalpel. Fire is also a ruthless and unpredictable teacher, as the lessons of Mack Lake demonstrate. We can only hope that future lessons will be learned in less-destructive ways, and will help us understand better how we can use a capricious natural phenomenon to our best advantage - and that of our planet. - Louis Borie, American Forest writer, July 1981

Remembering James Lee Swidersky

[Photo: Kari Greer/USFS]
#WOR2022, #honorthroughlearning, #neverforget

Week of Remembrance 2021 - Day 7

Preparing for Our Future 

Today is the twenty-seventh anniversary of a single shift on the South Canyon Fire that took the lives of 14 firefighters. We use this solemn day to remember that instance as we culminate a week of reflection to honor all our sisters and brothers who have perished in the line of duty. We honor them through learning.

WOR 2021 - Day 2

Leadership Level 1, Follower (Provide Action)

Followers have several responsibilities: to become competent in basic job skills, take initiative, learn from others, ask questions, and develop communication skills.

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions

(View of the Mann Gulch fire from the plane)

We talk a lot about the importance of crew cohesion within the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. Teams must be cohesive. But what happens to the team when chaos wrecks havoc within the fire environment? Do we follow our individual instinct or do we defer to others with more knowledge and experience?

Remembering Cramer

(Photo credit: Wildfire Today)

In the Salmon River Breaks of central Idaho, fire is a frequent visitor. The area has a somewhat legendary status in the pantheon of wildland fire, known for the steep slopes that rise seemingly without end from the Salmon River to the timbered ridges high above, where bighorn sheep mingle with rattlesnakes, and firefighters know to take extra care at every step. The Breaks play a role in the stories of many fire managers, some amusing, some somber, all taking into account that this is a place where firefighters must take care, or risk being broken by the land.

Remembering the Dude

Incident Summary
June of 1990 will long be remembered as one of the hottest months in Arizona history. On June 26th the temperature rose to record temperatures of 122 F in Phoenix and to 106 F in Payson. In addition to the extreme temperatures, Arizona had been in a severe 3 year drought, the combination producing a critically high fire danger throughout the state, especially the Mogollon Rim country and the Tonto National Forest north of Payson. Fuels in the area are primarily ponderosa pine with an understory of mixed oak, manzanita, needle and leaf litter, and scattered large (greater than 6 inch diameter) dead logs. Much of the understory brush is heavily draped with very dry pine needles. Live fuel moisture of the manzanita and oak is very low (76%), fine dead fuel moisture is 3% and 8% for larger dead fuels.

WEEK OF REMEMBRANCE - Day 7: Leadership and South Canyon

Today is dedicated to the 14 firefighters that lost their lives on Storm King Mountain in Colorado 23 years ago today.

Have We Done Enough?

 
As a member of the wildland fire service or a friend or family member of someone who is, you know that the Fourth of July weekend is always a busy time of the year for firefighters. This particular holiday is not one many of us get to celebrate. In fact, most of us are supporting fireline operations in one fashion or another.

50 Years Ago - Loop Fire

On November 1, 1966, the El Cariso Hotshots, a U.S. Forest Service Interregional Wildland Firefighting Crew, was trapped by flames as they worked on a steep hillside in Pacoima Canyon on the Angeles National Forest.

The crew was constructing fireline downhill into a chimney canyon and were within 200 feet of completing their assignment when a sudden shift of winds caused a spot fire directly below where they were working. Within seconds flames raced uphill, engulfing the firefighters in temperatures estimated to reach 2500 degrees F. The fire flashed through the 2,200 foot long chimney canyon in less than one minute, catching the crew while they attempted to reach their safety zones.

(Photo Credit: Herald Examiner)

Ten members of the crew perished on the Loop Fire that day. Another two members succumbed from burn injuries in the following days. Most of the nineteen members who survived were critically burned and remained hospitalized for some time.

Much of the knowledge gained about wildland fire has come through the high cost of firefighter lives. Lessons learned from the Loop Fire resulted in improved firefighting equipment, better fire behavior training, and the implementation of new firefighter safety protocols.

(Note: The Loop fire ends at 11:41)

(Interviews with Gordon King and Chuck Hartley)



We Will Never Forget
We will never forget the 12 firefighters who lost their lives in the line of duty on November 1, 1966.

• Kenneth Barnhill - 19
• Raymond Chee - 23
• Fredrick Danner - 18
• John P. Figlo - 18
• Joel A. Hill - 19
• Daniel J. Moore - 21
• James A. Moreland - 22
• Carl J. Shilcutt - 26
• John D. Verdugo - 19
• William J. Waller - 21
• Michael R. White - 20
• Stephen White - 18

Loop Fire Resources

• Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program Loop fire staff ride and references
• 6 Minutes for Safety ~ This Day in History (Loop Fire)
• Lesson Learned Center Loop Fire references (including investigation report)
• El Cariso Hot Shots 1966 website

L-580 Strategic Leader Program - San Diego County Megafires: An All-Hazards Interactive Case Study

Participants should be senior incident managers, senior leaders of emergency response agencies, public utilities and other critical infrastructure; leaders in the agency administrator role, elected officials and appointees who would likely be involved in setting the strategic direction of a large scale event.

Historical Firestorm events in the San Diego region have been on unprecedented, fast moving scales of complexity. The scope of the Political, Security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PSESII) dimensions have presented huge challenges to incident and emergency managers.

Battlement Creek Fire, Colorado – July 17, 1976

Battlement Creek Fire, Colorado – July 17, 1976

It’s 1976 and western Colorado is experiencing an unusually severe fire season caused partly by unusual fuel conditions and heavy lightning activity during dry weather. A severe frost in June kills a high percentage of the leaves on Gambel oak which remain on the branches and is considered one of Colorado’s most flammable fuels. 10 hour fuels are at 3-5%. A large scale high pressure weather pattern sits over western Colorado allowing for local weather to be influenced by terrain and diurnal winds averaging 10-15 mph in the afternoon with higher gusts. The weather is fair and hot with the temperatures at Grand Junction and Rifle reaching into the mid and upper 90’s. A fire is reported 40 miles northeast of Grand Junction, in the Battlement Creek drainage. The fire is burning over an elevation range of 6200-8400 ft on a steep west-facing slope.
Friday, July 16, 0630: Two hotshot crews from the Coconino NF Arizona arrive at the Battlement Creek fire. This is the seventeenth fire of the first season for the newly formed Mormon Lake Hotshot Crew. The strategy is to prevent western and southern spread. The crews begin a major burnout of the catline (dozer line) from the rocky bluffs (Point A) at about 1615, downhill along the catline toward the Battlement Creek road at the bottom (Point C) ending about 2030. The fire makes an uphill run in oak brush burning out a large portion of the drainage (from the road east to the ridge top) in about 20 minutes. Two “impressive” fire whirls are observed between 1600-1700. The night shift continues the burn out (Point C-D and beyond along the road) but is spotty with considerable unburned fuel remaining. Other night shift crews construct line along the ridge top (Point E to G). Based on Friday’s fire behavior, the E-G line is a crucial spot on the fire.

Saturday, July 17th, 0700, at morning briefing: The Mormon Lake crew is assigned to burn out this section of line.

Saturday morning, July 17th: Due to a delay with the helicopter, the Mormon Lake crew does not get to the base of the rock bluff (Point E) until 1100. They are instructed to improve and burn out the line from the rocky bluff to the helispot (Point E-G). The burnout squad consisted of the crew boss, squad boss and 2 crewmembers. The rest of the crew is improving the handline down the ridge top.

At this same time another crew is burning out in the bottom of the draw (Point C-D). The draw burns readily, uphill toward the ridge and the Mormon Lake crew. Neither crew knew of the specific location or assignment of the other.

1400: 1/3 the way from the rock bluff to the upper helispot, there is a noticeable increase in smoke from the draw below (where the other crew had been burning). The crew boss is instructed to speed up the line improvement squad on toward the safety zone (Point G) and to narrow down and speed up his burnout on down the ridgeline to join the remainder of the crew in the safety zone when his burnout was done. Upslope winds have increased to 25-35 mph.

1425-1440: The line improvement squad just makes it into the safety zone when the flame front hits the ridge. 200 yards back, the burnout squad radios that they are “trapped”. Their escape is blocked by heavy smoke and flames.

1440-1445: The squad removes their canvas vests to cover their head and face, moistened the vests and their clothes with water from their canteens, and lays face down in the mineral soil of the fireline.

1448: All four firefighters are very badly burned.
Three will lose their lives.

Discussion Points
The crew all wore aluminum hardhats, canvas vests, Nomex shirts and non-fire-resistant work pants. Fire shelters were not used. Fire shelters may have prevented serious burns and death at this incident. Policy on issuing and carrying shelters had not been established yet. This incident became the catalyst for the mandatory use of fire shelters and fire resistant clothing.

Action Item
Take this opportunity to inspect, repair or replace your PPE and fire shelter if needed to ensure that it protects you as well as possible

Leadership is Action - Digging a Little Deeper
Be sure to learn more about the Battlement Creek fire via the Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program Staff Ride Library.

Thirtymile Fire – July 10, 2001 - Washington

Incident Summary
The Chewuch River runs down a deep "V" canyon with 70% to 100% slopes and little elevation change along the canyon floor. The SW to NE orientation of the canyon aligns with afternoon ridge and upcanyon winds. Dead fuel moistures are 10 hour at 3%, 100 hour at 5%, and 1000 hour at 10% (historic lows) and live fuels generally less than 100%. Ladder fuels are abundant on the canyon floor and riparian fuels are dry enough to support surface fire and torching throughout the night of July 9th and into the morning of July 10th. Crown fuels are dense and drought stressed. The temperature reaches 94° F with an RH of 8% along the canyon floor.

• Local firefighters considered it unusual for green foliage to be burning like it was for this time of year. If you are not familiar with local conditions of a fire you are being dispatched to, what are some quick and effective tools you can use to gain an understanding of that area?

9:26 p.m., July 9th a fire is reported near the road along the Chewuch River. The fire is about five acres with two spots ahead of it. An engine with 3 firefighters arrives just after 11 pm. One engine arrives just before midnight. An IHC arrives at 1:00 am after working another fire all day and having had only 30 minutes of sleep. The engine departs the fire around 1:30 am. A local Type 2 crew is called up just after midnight. A majority of the crew has had only one or two hours of sleep. By 5:30 am July 10th there are seven spots covering about five to six acres. Two spots are about an acre each.

• Identify and discuss the red flags that “pop-up” during this 8 hour period. If this was your crew, what would you be doing to identify and mitigate them?

At 7:00 am the Type 2 crew gets a briefing at a ranger station prior to heading to the fire and is informed that they will be doing mop-up. They arrive at the fire at 9:00 am. The IHC leaves the fire for rest at 11:00 am. Mid-morning fire intensity increases with more frequent torching and increasingly longer spotting distances. By about noon the crew is experiencing difficulties with the pumps and multiple broken handtools. Just after noon the IC requests additional resources including a helicopter. The IHC returns to the fire around 2:00 pm with less than 3 hours of rest.

• Though water was readily available, relatively little was applied to the fire during the night and morning. This was largely due to operational problems with pumps and hoses, as well as delays in availability of a helicopter. In this situation, how would you and your crew adapt your tactics and develop your trigger points?

The fire has been burning through hoses and spotting over the line. The IC pulls the crew back to the road and accepts the fact that the fire was lost. At 3:00 pm the Type 2 crew is joined by the IHC at the "safety zone" on the west side of the river. The helicopter makes water drops on small spots on the south edge of the fire until having to refuel. The fire had spread up the east canyon walls and soon after had moved back to the canyon floor with spotting on the west wall of the canyon. At 3:20 pm, the fire is 50 acres, crowning and going to the ridge. At 3:35 pm the fire is 100 acres.

Two engines are ordered and arrive around 3:30 pm neither checking in with the IC nor receiving a tactical briefing. One engine crew radios for help with a spot. One, then eventually all of the squads of the Type II crew are sent to assist the engines with spots along the road. Minutes later the fire is actively spotting and is burning right up to the east side of the road. Some firefighters quickly drive back down the road to their “safety zone" shielding their faces from the intense heat as they pass the fire. 4:03 pm the Thirtymile Fire is forming its own thunderhead. A call is made to the other firefighters to get everyone out of the area. 4:34 pm, as the firefighters attempt to retreat they see a "wall of flames," and quickly turn around and drive up the canyon. 5:00 pm the fire is over 500 acres.

• Records indicate that firefighters on the Thirtymile Fire had very little sleep prior to their assignments, and mental fatigue affected situational awareness and decision-making. How can you recognize fatigue in yourself and in your crew/team? Discuss what you WILL do about it?

The fire makes a strong up-canyon run. 5:24 pm, roaring, ash and a “fire snowstorm” abruptly overwhelm the area and surprises the crew. Cut off from their only escape route, back down the road, 8 firefighters and 2 civilians deploy on the road and 6 firefighters on the talus slope. 4 firefighters do not survive.

• 4 of the 6 firefighters that deployed on the talus slope did not survive. Using pages 30-31 in your IRPG, discuss the features of an optimal and survivable deployment site. Practice looking for them on PT hikes, patrolling the fireline, and while prepping prescribed burn units.

Digging a Little Deeper
This Day in History is a brief summary of a powerful learning opportunity and is not intended to second guess or be judgmental of decisions and actions. Put yourself in the following situation as if you do not know what the outcome will be.

• What are the conditions? 
• What are you thinking? 
• What are YOU doing?

References
Thirtymile Fire Investigation Report
Staff Ride

---

This Day in History is a collaborative project between 6 Minutes for Safety and the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center.

Redaction - The Missing Common Denominator

Written by Rowdy Muir

“Redaction”

The Missing Common Denominator

Written by Rowdy Muir

The purpose of a “Blog” is to get a discussion going. This article certain received a lot of attention. I want to thank all the many positive comments. Thanks to Chuck Maxwell with helping with proper language.

However, as a leader I need to own my mistake in misrepresenting some of the language.

First,  the numbers were to reflect fatalities and entrapment fires not that if you were in these categories that you had an 80% chance of death. 

Second, the numbers were to reflect all firefighters not just wildland firefighters.

So with that being said, here is the redacted version of the article. Again, please except my apologies.

Honor & Learning - Rattlesnake Staff Ride

Looking Back and Remembering Our Fallen

In preparation for the 2016 fire season, the Carson City District BLM took its entire fire staff to the Rattlesnake staff ride on the Mendocino National Forest. This idea came from the District’s operations group that was tasked to come up with a team building exercise to help prepare our on the ground leaders for the 2016 fire season. Justin Cutler, Assistant Superintendent for the Silver State Hotshots coordinated with the Mendocino Hotshots to make this happen. Chris Markey, Superintendent for the Mendocino Hotshots facilitated our staff ride. 

On July 9, 1953, a brush fire started Northwest of Elk Creek, CA on the Mendocino National Forest. That evening 24 men were sent to contain a spot fire. The wind shifted and the main fire jumped containment lines. Nine of the men made it to safety, however 15 men were overran and perished by the quick moving fire.

What We Learned from the Rattlesnake Staff Ride

• Remembering and learning from history helps bring the importance of what we do closer to heart.
• Helped create District cohesion by going through the staff ride as a team.
• Helped see where we have been and where firefighting is now.
• Helped see the importance of good communication between resources. 
• Helped show the importance of having clear escape routes to sufficient safety zones.
• Helped show the importance of being aware of local weather influences.
• Helped identify areas of focus for the 2016 fire season to bring back for our seasonal staff.

**********************************

A special thank you to Shane McDonald, Jon Palma, Justin Cutler, members of the Carson City District BLM and Chris Markey. All pictures are compliments of the Carson City District BLM.

For more information, check out the Rattlesnake fire in the Staff Ride Library. 

Walking on Hallowed Ground

by Tim Sendelbach
Editor-in-chief Firehouse® Magazine
September 2015

The lessons we learn should never be limited by geographical or professional bias

On Oct. 26, 2006, initial-attack resources from CAL FIRE were dispatched to a fire burning in the Southern California town of Cabazon. With high temperatures, low humidity and Santa Ana winds in the forecast, the potential for rapid-fire growth was extreme.

As the fire grew to more than 500 acres, resources from the U.S. Forest Service were called in. This included the five-person crew of Engine 57. 

Upon their arrival, Engine 57 and four other companies were directed to assist with structural protection. With the fire advancing rapidly, an evacuation order was given, and the assigned crews were directed to report to staging. Caught up in the congestion created by local citizens trying to evacuate at the same time, several of the assigned engine crews were delayed in getting back to the designated staging area. 

After some time had passed, Engine 57 and Engine 52 were assigned to perform structural triage. After completing an evacuation of a residence, the captain of Engine 52 called the captain of Engine 57 to have them come to their location. With the crew set on a high point with an in-ground pool for a water supply and lines deployed, the Engine 57 captain reported back that they were at a good location and would remain there. 

With fire rapidly advancing from multiple fronts, crews began performing burnout operations to set up a defensive perimeter against the advancing fire front. Tragically, the members of Engine 57 were overrun by fire, and five firefighters died. 

Regrettably, my recollection of this incident prior to this past August was minimal at best. I’ve taken great pride in being a continual student of this profession, but I had failed to realize the many lessons that exist outside the world of structural firefighting. 

Admittedly, I’ve never laced up a pair of wildland fire boots in my career. I’ve never been on the operational end of a Pulaski or a drip can, nor have I spent any measurable time performing burnout operations or working “in the black.” But on Aug. 5, I visited the site of the Esperanza Fire, and I walked the hallowed ground that today includes a memorial dedicated to the five firefighters of Engine 57. 

As I walked up the driveway toward the now infamous Octagon House (the structure Engine 57 was attempting to protect when the burnover occurred), the dry, oven-like winds hit me head on as I encountered the marker bearing the name Pablo, representing the location of fallen Firefighter Pablo Cerda. A short distance up the driveway was a marker representing the location of Captain Mark Loutzenhiser. Over the embankment, to the left, was the marker for Firefighter Daniel Hoover-Najera. At the top, separated by less than 30 feet, were the markers for Fire Engine Operator Jess “Gus” McLean and Assistant Fire Engine Operator Jason McKay. 

As I looked at the markers for these five men, the complexity of wildland firefighting and wildland/urban interface (WUI) fires became incredibly clear and, to some degree, even frightening. 

In the structural world, we talk about fire dynamics and the increased fuel loading of the modern fireground. But what happens when your fuel loading is no longer measured in cubic feet, but rather acres, and your flow path is no longer an open door, but rather a prevailing wind? What happens when go or no-go decision-making goes from an individual structure to an entire neighborhood, or command and control goes from a first-alarm assignment of 12–17 firefighters representing a single department to more than 200 engines, 550 firefighters and numerous air resources deployed from areas throughout the state and, potentially, the nation? 

It has been echoed many times throughout our ranks that there is no greater tribute to our fallen than to learn from the tragic events that contributed to their deaths. As I read the events surrounding the Esperanza Fire, it is clear that WE (wildland and structural firefighters) have a lot to learn from each other. 

While the arenas in which we operate may differ, the challenges of leadership, politics, decision-making, human factors and risk management are much the same. Our shared mission is to save lives and protect property, and the hallowed grounds of our fallen represent an obligation to learn, share and apply these lessons without geographical or professional bias. I challenge you to take a look on the other side and see what you’ve been missing.

******************************

TIM SENDELBACH is a 29-year student and educator of the fire and emergency services, currently serving as the editorin-chief for Firehouse. He is responsible for the content and editorial direction of Firehouse® Magazine, Firehouse.com, Firehouse Expo, Firehouse World and related products. He has served as an assistant fire chief with the North Las Vegas, NV, Fire Department, as the chief of training for Savannah, GA, Fire & Emergency Services and as assistant fire chief for Missouri City, TX, Fire & Rescue Services. He is a credentialed Chief Fire Officer and Chief Training Officer and has earned a master’s degree in leadership from Bellevue University, bachelor’s degrees in fire administration and arson and an associate’s degree in emergency medical care from Eastern Kentucky University.

We would like to thank Tim and Firehouse® Magazine for allowing us to reprint this article.  Follow Tim on Facebook or Twitter.