Accidents—and the reviews and investigations that follow—have been part of the wildland fire service since the time before the pulaski. And over the years, the focus and the tone of accident reviews have changed.
In the wake of the Thirtymile and Cramer fire investigations, a shift in post-accident reviews began to take shape. This shift was also occurring in other high-risk industries as well. We all want to figure out why our employees were hurt or killed and what—if anything—can be learned to prevent a similar occurrence.
Beginning with a firefighter entrapment review on the Balls Canyon Fire in 2005 and a Peer Review the following year on the Little Venus Fire in Wyoming, a fundamental change emerged in the way accidents are reviewed and lessons are captured. In 2007, the first Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) Guide laid the foundation for today’s learning-focused accident reviews.
Prior to this effort, accident reviews tended to describe “errors” and what firefighters should have seen, understood, or done. This recent shift makes an effort to understand how those involved “made sense” of the situation given the information available at the time.
This view seeks to acknowledge and describe the conditions, pressures, motivations and restrictions present in the situation. In this view, a full accounting of the conditions allows for genuine dialogue regarding potential lessons and learning.
In a learning organization, every member of a team is responsible for leading themselves in learning and sharing what they know with their peers.
Firefighters are responsible to help their captains and chief officers design effective learning opportunities. Captains and chiefs are responsible for creating a command climate where learning is valued and learning initiatives from firefighters are encouraged.
[Click here to download Learning in the Wildland Fire Service.]
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